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Abstract
We develop a model of competition in the solar panel industry. Solar ﬁrms manufacture pan-
els that are diﬀerentiated both vertically and horizontally, and compete by setting quantities.
The equilibrium of the model is consistent with a set of stylized facts that we document,
including variation in prices, markups and market shares across ﬁrms. We calibrate the
model using a new dataset data on prices, costs and shipments of leading solar companies,
as well as solar sales in four leading markets. The calibrated model is applied to evaluate the
impact of a decline in the price of polysilicon, a key raw material used in the manufacture
of solar panels, on the equilibrium price of solar panels.
Keywords: Photovoltaics, Competition, Polysilicon
JEL: L19,  L13, O30
1. Introduction
The electricity generation sector is the leading contributor of greenhouse gas emissions.
Most plans to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions view solar photovoltaics as an electricity
generation technology with potential to replace a sizeable section of fossil fuel generation
(see Nakicenovic and Riahi (2002); Baker and Solak (2011); Lewis and Nocera (2006)). At
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present however, electricity from solar photovoltaics constitute a very small fraction of the
world electricity production. The cost of generating electricity from solar PV systems have
fallen over time. A major factor behind this decline has been the continual decrease in the
price of solar panels (also called solar modules), the principal component in PV systems.
These declines have brought the price of solar generated electricity closer to the price of
electricity generated from conventional sources, but a gap still remains.
There has been an extensive examination in the literature of factors that have contributed
to the decline in solar module prices. Most of the existing studies are based on learning
curves, which extrapolate past observations about the relationship between the price of
solar modules and the volume of production (for example, see Swanson (2006) and Schaeﬀer
(2004)). There have been other studies, for example Nemet (2006) and Bruton (2002),
which look at the contribution of various factors like plant size and module eﬃciency in
reducing the price of solar modules. Learning curve models and models like Nemet (2006)
are suited to explain how diﬀerent factors aﬀect the cost of production. The use of these
models in predicting changes in price depend entirely on the assumption that changes in
cost will translate into identical changes in price. If the solar module industry was perfectly
competitive with modules being sold at a price equal to its marginal cost, then any reduction
in cost would result in the same reduction in price. The solar module industry, however,
is not a perfectly competitive industry. As documented in section 2, there are diﬀerences
in prices, markups and market shares of diﬀerent ﬁrms in the industry, all indicative of
deviation from the assumption of perfect competition. Under imperfect competition, the
eﬀect on price of a change in cost would depend on how ﬁrms respond to the change in cost.
The use of price instead of cost in learning curve models and in Nemet (2006) provide a useful
simpliﬁcation, but ignoring the role of competition among ﬁrms in determining equilibrium
prices is not without consequence. For example, Nemet (2006) ﬁnds that changes in factors
that aﬀect cost can only explain a part of the change in the price of solar modules in some
of the years considered in his study. He argues that there was an increase in the extent of
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competition in the industry in those years, which might partially account for the residual
variation in price over and above the variation in cost. A contribution of this paper is to
develop a model that explicitly incorporates competition among ﬁrms in the industry and
can be used to evaluate how changes in costs aﬀect the selling price of solar modules.
In section 2 we lay down three empirical observations that capture the salient features of
competition in the industry. In section 3, we develop a model that is consistent with these
observations. The model derives a demand function for solar modules, taking into account
the behavior of electric utility companies, power producers and solar module manufacturers.
Electric utility companies, who deliver electricity to consumers (either directly or through
local distribution companies), purchase electricity from solar power producers, who can be
individual households, businesses or commercial power producing companies. These solar
power producers in turn demand solar modules from module manufacturers. The solar
modules made by diﬀerent ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated both vertically and horizontally. The
module ﬁrms compete by setting quantities and we derive a set of equations that can be
used to compute the equilibrium prices, markups and market shares in this Cournot model.
The model can be extended to incorporate other features of the solar industry, and sec-
tion 4 describes some of the possible extensions. The inclusion of non-module (or balance-
of-system) costs does not aﬀect the equilibrium strategies of the module ﬁrms but increases
the price of solar generated electricity. The eﬀect of diﬀerences in insolation (the intensity
of incident sunlight) can be easily incorporated in the model. Finally, the model can be
extended to consider the impact of changes in usage of diﬀerent factors of production on
price of solar modules. These extensions can be used to investigate the impact of decline
in balance-of-system costs, the impact of diﬀerences in insolation, and the impact of tech-
nological improvements like reduction in raw material requirements or plant automation on
the equilibrium price of solar modules and of electricity generated from solar modules. The
data necessary to calibrate the basic model described in section 3 can obtained from publicly
available sources, as described in section 5.
3
In section 6, we put the calibrated model to use for one application. The price of polysili-
con, a key raw material used in the manufacture of solar modules, has declined in the last few
years and analysts expect further reductions in the price of polysilicon. We use the model to
evaluate the impact of decline in polysilicon price on the price of solar modules. Alternative
simulations are performed to evaluate the impact of decline in polysilicon price if competition
among ﬁrms intensify because of standardization of modules, or if solar generated electricity
becomes more diﬀerentiated from electricity generated from other sources.
We begin by giving a brief description of the solar module industry in the next section.
2. The Solar Module Industry
The solar module industry consists of a number of ﬁrms located in many countries. The
output of the ﬁrms is usually measured in watts of solar modules.1 In 2011, the solar mod-
ule industry shipped around 28,000 megawatts of solar modules.2 Contrary to the casual
observation that solar modules are standardized homogenous products, solar modules sold
by diﬀerent companies diﬀer in many ways. The most signiﬁcant of these diﬀerences is in
the efficiency with which they convert sunlight to electricity. The more eﬃcient the solar
modules are, the smaller is the size of the module required to produce a unit of electricity.
Small module size (or fewer modules) translate to lower expenses on the accessories required
to mount the module on a rooftop or ground. Thus higher eﬃciency is valued in a quan-
tiﬁable way, and we capture this by treating solar modules as being vertically diﬀerentiated
with regard to eﬃciency. Even after adjusting for the eﬃciency of the modules, there is a
dispersion in the price charged per watt by diﬀerent ﬁrms in the industry (see Figure 1).
In addition to eﬃciency, the modules sold by diﬀerent companies diﬀer in other technical
1Ideally, a solar module rated at 1 watt when exposed to sunlight for 1 hour would generate 1 watt-hour
of electricity. In practice however, the amount of electricity generated depends on the intensity of sunlight,
the angle at which the modules are mounted, etc.
2A megawatt is a million watts.
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Figure 1: Efficiency Adjusted Price of Solar Modules in 2011.
Notes: The prices were calculated by dividing the annual revenues of the companies by their annual
shipments. The variable on the y-axis is price divided by efficiency of the modules. See section 5 for the
sources of data.
attributes as well in commercial attributes, like the oﬀered warranty period. Further, ﬁrms
also diﬀer in their access to distribution and marketing channels, which are important in
the sales of solar modules. These diﬀerences in product characteristics, together with the
dispersion in eﬃciency-adjusted prices seen in Figure 1, suggest that a diﬀerentiated goods
model with ﬁrms engaging in monopolistic competition would be appropriate for the industry.
However, in contrast to the popular Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition
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model, there is also a dispersion in the markups charged by the ﬁrms in the industry. Figure
2 plots the markups (gross margins) of companies against their market shares. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, bigger ﬁrms tend to have bigger markups as would be implied by a Cournot
model, although there are deviations from a simple linear relationship. The observations
above can be summarized in three stylized facts,
1. There is a dispersion in eﬃciency adjusted prices across ﬁrms.
2. There is a dispersion in markups across ﬁrms.
3. Larger ﬁrms tend to have bigger markups.
The next section develops a model of the solar module industry that is consistent with
the three observations above.
3. The Model
Our model is a modiﬁcation of the model developed in Smith and Venables (1988) and
Atkeson and Burstein (2008). We develop the model in a number of steps, and begin by
deriving the demand for solar modules in the next section.
3.1. Demand
The electricity industry consists of three vertically connected segments. At the very top
are the electric utility companies who sell electricity to ﬁnal consumers. At the next rung are
the power producers (including solar power producers) who own power plants and generate
electricity which they sell to the electric utility companies. At the bottom rung are the
equipment companies, like solar module companies, who manufacture the equipment used
by power producers to generate electricity. Demand for solar electricity, and hence solar
modules, is essentially driven by government policies, which diﬀer across countries. In many
European countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, France and Czechoslovakia), the government
requires electric utility companies to buy electricity generated by solar power producers at a
6
0
10
20
30
40
M
ar
ku
p 
(%
)
0 2 4 6 8
Market Share (%)
Module Markups and Revenue Market Shares −
2011
Figure 2: Bigger firms tend to have higher markups.
Notes: Each point in the graph corresponds to a firm. The market shares were obtained by dividing the
annual revenue of the firm by an estimate of the total sales of solar modules. The estimate of total sales
was obtained by multiplying the average price of firms in the dataset by the total shipment of solar
modules in 2011.
guaranteed price. In many U.S states on the other hand, the demand for solar modules stem
from Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) mandates, which require electric utility companies
to obtain a portion of the total electricity that they sell from renewable sources. We abstract
from the diﬀerences in policies and assume that for an electric utility company, the eﬀect
of these policies is to make solar generated electricity an imperfect substitute for electricity
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generated from other sources.3 Electric utility companies choose the quantities of electricity
to procure from solar producers and other producers so as to minimize their total cost of
production, i.e they solve the problem,
min
Qs,Qc
PsQs + PcQc
s.t
(
Q
η−1
η
s +Q
η−1
η
c
) η
η−1
= Q.
where Qs is the quantity of electricity that the utility purchases from solar power producers,
Qc is the quantity they purchase from non-solar sources, Q is the total quantity of electricity
that the utility has to produce, Ps is the price of solar generated electricity, Pc is the price of
electricity generated from conventional sources, and η is the elasticity of substitution between
solar electricity and electricity generated from other sources. The solution for the problem
gives the demand for solar electricity as,
Qs = Q
(
Ps
P
)
−η
, (1)
where P is the aggregate price index for electricity given by P =
(
Ps
1−η + Pc
1−η
) 1
1−η . Hence,
if the price of solar electricity relative to the aggregate price index for electricity (Ps
P
) de-
creases, the utility shifts away from conventional electricity and increases its procurement of
solar electricity.
The solar power producers, the second rung in the electricity industry, can be individual
households who have solar panels on top of their houses, or companies who collect solar
electricity from many households and sell to utilities (often called aggregators in the indus-
try), or solar power plants. We model this as a competitive segment and ﬁrms earn zero
3In addition to differences in regulatory policies, production variability is another important difference
between solar generation and generation from conventional sources. There is variability in the generation of
electricity from solar because of unpredictable changes in the environment, like the onset of clouds. Such
unforeseeable variability does not exist for generation through coal or natural gas.
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proﬁts in this segment. Each solar power producer buys solar modules, which we model as a
diﬀerentiated good, and uses these modules to generate electricity. As mentioned in section
2, ﬁrms are vertically diﬀerentiated by the conversion eﬃciency of the modules that they sell.
To accommodate this, we consider the the eﬃciency adjusted units of solar modules used by
a power producer. In addition to this vertical diﬀerentiation with regard to eﬃciency, solar
modules are also horizontally diﬀerentiated. We capture this using the production function
for the solar power producer,
Qs =
(
N∑
j=1
(ejqj)
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(2)
where qj is the quantity of modules from module producer j, ej is the eﬃciency of modules
from producer j, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent types of modules.
We make the reasonable assumption that ρ > η > 1, i.e the elasticity of substitution between
solar electricity and electricity generated from other sources is less than the elasticity of
substitution between diﬀerent types of modules. Competitive solar power producers solve
the problem,
max
qj
PsQs −
N∑
j=0
pjqj
s.t Qs =
(
N∑
j=1
(ejqj)
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
This gives the demand for ﬁrm-j’s modules as
qjej = Qs
(
pj/ej
Pm
)
−ρ
= Q
(
Ps
P
)
−η (
pj/ej
Pm
)
−ρ
. (3)
where Pm is the eﬃciency adjusted aggregate price index for modules, given by,
Pm =
(
N∑
i=1
(
pi
ei
)1−ρ) 11−ρ
(4)
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Hence the demand for solar modules for ﬁrm-j depends both on how expensive the ﬁrm’s solar
module is relative to that sold by other ﬁrms,
(
pj/ej
Pm
)
, and how expensive solar electricity
is relative to electricity from other generation sources
(
Ps
P
)
. Since solar power producers
are perfectly competitive, they make zero proﬁt, and hence the price of solar electricity is
given by,
Ps = Pm (5)
Hence the demand equation (3) can be written as
qjej = Q
(
Ps
P
)
−η (
pj/ej
Ps
)
−ρ
. (6)
Having derived the demand facing each module producer, we move on to the optimal
pricing decisions made by the module producers given the demand function above that they
face.
3.2. Equilibrium
We assume that the solar module ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition. Each solar ﬁrm
takes P , the price index for electricity as given when making its quantity and price decisions.
But the ﬁrm considers the eﬀect of its decisions on the solar module price index, Pm, and
the price of solar electricity, Ps. We assume that module ﬁrms have a constant marginal cost
of production, and denote module ﬁrm-j’s marginal cost by cj
4. Firm-j solves the problem,
max
qj
pjqj − cjqj
s.t qjej = Q
(
Ps
P
)
−η (
pj/ej
Ps
)
−ρ
,
Ps =
(
N∑
i=1
(pi/ei)
1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
4It is possible that the marginal cost would decrease with increases in production (see Nemet (2006)),
but we ignore that for purposes of tractability.
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Solving the above problem gives the result that equilibrium price exceeds cost by a factor
given by,
pj
cj
=
1
1−
sj
η
−
1− sj
ρ
, (7)
where sj =
pjqj∑
i piqi
is the market share of ﬁrm-j. Equation (7) can be rewritten to obtain
the markup (gross margin) as,
pj − cj
pj
=
sj
η
+
1− sj
ρ
(8)
Further, using equation (3), the market share can be written as
sj =
pjqj
N∑
i=1
piqi
=
pj
1
ej
Qs
(
pj/ej
Ps
)
−ρ
N∑
i=1
pi
1
ei
Qs
(
pi/ei
Ps
)
−ρ
=
(pj/ej)
1−ρ
N∑
i=1
(pi/ei)
1−ρ
(9)
The model is consistent with the observations about competition in the industry summa-
rized in Section 2. Since ρ > 1, equation (9) implies that bigger ﬁrms (larger market share
sj) charge a lower eﬃciency-adjusted price (p/e). Given this, and the assumption that ρ > η,
equation (7) implies that ﬁrms with higher eﬃciency-adjusted marginal cost (c/e) charge a
higher eﬃciency adjusted-price (p/e).5 Thus ﬁrms charge diﬀerent eﬃciency-adjusted prices,
consistent with Figure 1 and stylized fact 1. Equation (8) implies that ﬁrms charge diﬀerent
markups, consistent with stylized fact 2. Since ρ > η, equation (8) also implies that bigger
ﬁrms charging higher markups, consistent with Figure 2 and stylized fact 3.
5This is most easily seen by considering equation (7) for two firms, say firm 1 and firm 2. Equation (7)
implies that
p1/e1
p2/e2
ρ−1
ρ
− s1
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
)
ρ−1
ρ
− s2
(
1
ρ
− 1
η
) = c1/e1
c2/e2
.
Hence if c1/e1 > c2/e2, it must be that p1/e1 > p2/e2. If p1/e1 < p2/e2, then equation (9) implies that
s1 > s2, and hence the left hand side of equation above will be less than one and right hand side greater
than one.
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Equation (7) makes clear that price can vary from cost. The factor by which price is
greater than cost depends on the market share of the ﬁrm, and the elasticities η and ρ.
For bigger ﬁrms, the price/cost factor is larger. As η increases, price/cost factor decreases
because the diﬀerentiation between solar generated electricity and electricity from other
sources decreases, and they become more direct competitors. As ρ increases, the price/cost
factor decreases because the diﬀerentiation among the diﬀerent module ﬁrms decreases and
they become more direct competitors.
It is straightforward to compute the equilibrium of the model, if the unit costs {cj},
eﬃciencies {ej}, and elasticities η and ρ are known. Substituting equation (9) in equation
(8) gives a system N non-linear equations in N unknowns prices, and hence can be solved to
obtain the equilibrium prices {pj}. The above model provides a tool to evaluate how module
prices change in response to changes in the cost of production of modules. In many cases
one is interested not only in the price of modules, but also in the price of a fully installed
solar generation system, as well as in the price of the electricity generated from such systems.
In section 4 we outline how the above model can be extended to accommodate this. With
additional data one can use the extension of the model to evaluate the impact of cost changes
on the price of a fully installed solar system and on the price of solar generated electricity.
4. Extensions of the Model
The basic model of competition in the solar panel industry described in section 3 can be
extended to incorporate other features of the industry.
4.1. Balance of System Costs and Insolation
The solar modules considered in the model above form the core of a solar photovoltaic
electricity generation system. In addition to the cost of the module itself, the cost of a
solar generation system also includes the cost of electrical components necessary to connect
the system with the electrical grid and the cost of mounting structures necessary to ﬁx the
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modules on a rooftop or on the ground. There are also non-hardware “soft-costs” - the cost
of getting a permit to install the system, the cost of labor necessary to install the system,
etc. As module costs are declining, the other costs, which are often collectively labeled the
balance-of-system costs, are becoming an important fraction of the total cost of the system
(see Feldman et al. (2012) and Aboudi (2012)). The balance-of-system costs can be added
to the model in a simple manner, by assuming that cost of the total solar system is a factor
k times the module cost, i.e the total cost is now k
N∑
i=1
pjqj .
Further, in addition to the characteristics of the solar module, the amount of electricity
that can be generated from a solar module also depends on the amount of sunlight that is
incident on the module. This parameter is referred to in the industry as insolation. This can
be incorporated into the model by modifying the production function in equation (2) to,
Qs = h
(
N∑
j=1
(ejqj)
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(10)
where the insolation factor h converts the rated power into the actual amount of electricity
produced.
It is to be noted that the balance-of-system cost factor k and insolation h can vary
across markets. The balance-of-system costs depend on the labor cost, permitting policies
in place and so on. For example, Seel et al. (2012) report that the balance-of-system cost
in Germany was lower than in the U.S in 2010. Similarly, the insolation factor would also
vary across markets, with sunny countries like Spain or India having higher h than countries
like Denmark or Germany. One could apply the above model to a speciﬁc region where the
insolation and balance-of-system cost factor remains the same across diﬀerent solar power
producers, under the assumption that each module producer treats every region as a diﬀerent
market. Under this assumption, the problem of the solar power producer in market-i becomes
max
qj
PsQs − k
i
N∑
j=0
pjqj
13
s.t Qs = h
i
(
N∑
j=1
(ejqj)
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
The demand function for each module and the price index for modules remain the same
as in the basic model (as given in equations (3) and (4) respectively). The equilibrium prices
and markups also remain the same as before, as given in equations (7) and (8) respectively.
But the price of solar generated electricity becomes P is =
ki
hi
Pm. Thus the price of solar
generated electricity will be lower in regions with lower balance of system costs and higher
insolation. With data on ki and hi, one could use this extension of the basic model to
evaluate the impact of a decrease in balance-of-system costs on the price of solar generated
electricity.
4.2. Technological Improvements
Many technological improvements have contributed to the decline in module prices. Im-
provements in eﬃciency has been an important contributor to the decline in module prices,
and the model described in section 3 can be used to simulate the impact of increases in
eﬃciency on module prices. Another important facet of technological progress has been in
the reduction of the quantity of inputs needed to produce a watt of modules. The quantity
of polysilicon needed to produce 1 watt of solar modules has decreased over the years (see
Swanson (2006) and Nemet (2006)). Such technological improvements can be incorporated
into the model by considering a Leontief production function for the production of solar
modules,
qj = Min(aMj , bLj)
where Mj is quantity of polysilicon used, Lj is the amount of labor used, a is the unit polysil-
icon requirement and b is the unit labor requirement. Module ﬁrm-j’s proﬁt maximization
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problem now becomes,
max
Mj ,Lj
pjqj − wLj − vMj
s.t qj = Min(aMj , bLj),
s.t qjej = Q
(
Ps
P
)
−η (
pj/ej
Ps
)
−ρ
,
Ps =
(
N∑
i=1
(pi/ei)
1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
where v is the price of polysilicon and w is the labor wage rate. The solution to the problem
remains the same as the ones described in section 3, with cj being replaced by
w
b
+
v
a
. The
model can then be simulated to understand the impact of a decrease in unit polysilicon
requirement (a decrease in a), or the eﬀect of a decrease in price of polysilicon (a decrease
in v).
In section 6, we describe how we can calibrate the model and simulate it to calculate
the impact of a decrease in v, the price of polysilicon. In the next section we describe the
sources of the data that we use to estimate the model parameters necessary to calibrate the
model.
5. Data and Calibration
In the simulations to evaluate the impact of a decline in polysilicon price on module price,
we model the solar module industry as being comprised of 15 companies. These include the
companies which were in the top 10 in terms of shipments in 2011 (Suntech, First Solar,
Yingli, Trina, Canadian Solar, Sharp, Hanwha Solarone, Jinko, Solarworld and LDK Solar)
and 5 other leading module manufacturers (Sunpower, REC, JA Solar, Kyocera and Aleo
Solar). Together these companies accounted for over 60% of the global shipments in solar
modules in 2011, and companies not in the list contributed less than 2 % each to the total
industry shipments. Among the 15 companies, 14 companies make solar modules using
polysilicon as the raw material. However the lowest cost ﬁrm, First Solar, uses a technology
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diﬀerent from the rest, and does not use polysilicon in its production process.6 We leave the
cost of First Solar at its 2011 level in our simulation.
The variable production costs of 12 of the above companies were obtained from their
annual reports. For each company, annual data was collected on cost of goods sold (COGS),
revenues and shipments. For the U.S companies, the data was collected from their annual
10-K statements. All the companies in the dataset that are based in China are registered
in U.S stock exchanges, and hence ﬁle an annual 20-F statement with the U.S Securities
and Exchange Commission. The format for the 20-F statement is similar to 10-K statement,
providing comparability between the data used for companies based in U.S and China. The
cost of goods sold (COGS) for the companies in the dataset ﬁling 10-K and 20-F includes
the cost of materials, direct labor cost, utilities and depreciation of capital, and excludes the
expenses on R&D, marketing and general administration. Hence the COGS reported by these
companies are a good measure of their variable cost of production. For the companies based
in Europe, the data was obtained from their annual reports. While some of the European
companies report the cost of goods sold, some report only the earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT). Subtracting the sum of EBIT and reported expenses on R&D, marketing and
general administration from the annual revenues, gives a measure of the variable cost of
production that is comparable to the COGS reported by companies registered on U.S stock
exchanges. All companies report their annual shipment of solar panels in watts.
The use of cost data derived from annual reports of companies has sometimes been
criticized in the literature. But there are a number of reasons to believe that concerns raised
are less severe for the cost data that is used in this study. First, all the companies whose
cost data is used in the analysis are pure solar companies, so the variable costs they report
in annual statements are those associated with solar production alone. Second, many of the
companies state in their annual reports that a substantial fraction of the COGS that they
6First Solar produces solar modules using Cadmium Telluride.
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report are material costs, which are usually correctly reﬂected in annual reports. Third,
the unit cost of production is the most closely watched metric in the industry, and market
analysts routinely publish estimates of the units costs of companies using their own methods.
It is quite likely that the close scrutiny by industry observers puts a heavy burden on the
ﬁrms to report their costs truthfully.
The average variable cost of producing solar panels for each ﬁrm was obtained by dividing
COGS by annual shipments. For the 3 companies for whom cost data was not available
(Sharp, Kyocera, and Jinko), we used equation (8) to obtain the unit costs of the companies,
given their prices and market shares. The prices for these companies were obtained from the
Photon Magazine or from their annual reports. To provide an illustration of the accuracy of
the model in backing out costs from prices, we plot in Figure 3 the costs backed out by the
model against the actual costs of the companies for which we have cost data.
We now turn to the two demand parameters whose values are needed to simulate the
model, the elasticity of substitution between solar and non-solar electricity, η, and the elas-
ticity of substitution between solar modules, ρ. A high η would imply that solar electricity
is less diﬀerentiated from electricity generated from other sources. We estimate the demand
elasticity from the data on module price and quantity sold in four markets - Germany, Italy,
Spain and France. The data on annual solar installations in these countries is taken from
IEA (2010) and is available for Germany from 1990-2010 and for the other three countries
from 1995-2010. The quantity sold in each of these markets is likely to be inﬂuenced by the
subsidy policies of the governments, which we include in the regression. We perform two
regressions to estimate η. In the ﬁrst regression, we do not use any instruments for price.
In the second regression, we instrument the price of solar modules with the total market
share of ﬁrms from China in the worldwide shipments of solar modules. The entry of ﬁrms
from China prompted a decline in prices, either because of low cost of production of ﬁrms in
China or because of production subsidies oﬀered in China. Hence the increasing penetration
of Chinese ﬁrms in the solar market represent a supply side shock not correlated to demand
17
Figure 3: Predicted versus actual costs.
Notes: Each point in the graph corresponds to a firm. The y-axis shows the costs backed out by the model
from the data on prices, and x-axis shows the actual cost. The vertical distance of each point from the the
x = y line is the deviation of the cost backed out by the model from the actual cost.
and hence is an appropriate instrument.7 The regression equation is,
ln (qit) = β0 + β1sit + β2 ln (rt) + η ln (pt) + ǫit (11)
7While there is a possibility that the Chinese firms might have anticipated the changes in government
subsidies, it should be noted that there was always considerable uncertainty regarding the continuity of the
subsidies in many countries.
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Table 1: Estimates of Demand Elasticity (η)
I II
Demand Elasticity (η) -5.34*** -6.13***
(0.45) (0.52)
β1 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.006) (0.006)
β0 -0.006 1.52
(1.42) (1.43)
Observations 52 52
R2 0.903 0.898
where qit is the quantity (watts) of solar modules sold in country i in year t, sit is the subsidy
(feed-in-tariﬀ) oﬀered in country i in period t, rt is price of polysilicon in year t, and pt is
the price per unit in year t. The regression results are given in Table 1.
Next, we move on to the value of ρ. A high ρ would mean that the modules are less
diﬀerentiated products, and in fact ρ→∞ would imply that the modules of diﬀerent com-
panies are perfect substitutes.8 As can be seen from equation (8), the value of ρ determines
the markup (gross margin) of a small ﬁrm with almost zero market share. From the annual
reports, we note that the ﬁxed operating costs in the industry (including Selling, General
and Administrative Expense and R&D expense) is on average 10% of the revenues of the
ﬁrms. Since a ﬁrm that cannot cover its ﬁxed cost will exit the industry, a value of ρ = 10
(which provides just enough proﬁts to cover the ﬁxed operating costs), seems appropriate.
The value ρ = 10 is also the one used by Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
8In fact, for the case of ρ→∞, the model collapses to the standard homogeneous good Cournot model.
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6. Impact of Polysilicon Price Decline
One of the factors that has contributed to the decline in module prices over the last few
decades is the decline in the price of polysilicon, the principal raw material used in building
crystalline silicon solar cells. The average price of solar modules has declined by a factor of
close to over 50 in the period 1975-2010, and the cost of the polysilicon needed to make one
watt of solar modules has decreased by a factor of 20 over the same period (see Figure 4).
Following a sharp increase during 2004-2008, the price of polysilicon almost halved dur-
ing 2008-2010. Yu et al. (2012) examine the reasons for the changes in polysilicon price
during 2004-2009 and conclude that demand shocks played an essential role in the ﬂuctu-
ations, as also did changes in cost of producing polysilicon.9 Generous subsidy schemes
for solar generated electricity implemented in many European countries led to a surge in
the demand for polysilicon. The rising polysilicon prices lead to an expansion in capacity
by existing polysilicon ﬁrms and the entry of many new ﬁrms into the industry.10 Total
worldwide polysilicon capacity increased from around 50,000 metric tons in 2005 to around
300,000 metric tons in 2010 (see Prior and Campbell (2012)). Based on investment plans
announced by polysilicon suppliers, Winegarner (2011) anticipates polysilicon capacity to
increase to over 500,000 metric tons in 2015. These increases have been accompanied by
improvements in the production technology, as polysilicon ﬁrms found ways to reduce the
9Yu et al. (2012) consider oil and natural gas shocks as the main source of changes in the production cost.
In addition to demand and production cost shocks, they also find that fluctuations in exchange rates had a
significant impact on polysilicon price. Note that the price of solar modules held steady despite the spike in
polysilicon price. This was possibly because of the increasing market penetration of lower cost firms from
China during the same period.
10Hemlock, the leading polysilicon supplier increased its capacity from 7700 to 36,000 metric tons from
2005 to 2010. Wacker, the second largest established polysilicon supplier, increased its capacity from 5500
to 24,000 metrics tons. New firms GCL-Poly and OCI entered the market in 2007-2008 and quickly build
their capacities to 21,000 and 27,000 metric tons in 2010.
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Figure 4: Decline in Solar Module Price and Cost of Polysilicon Used in Solar Modules.
Notes: The prices of solar modules for 1975-2006 were taken from Maycock (2002) and from the dataset at
Earth Policy Institute. The price of solar modules during 2007-2010 was taken as the quantity weighted
average of price of leading solar module companies. The data for polysilicon price and unit polysilicon
requirement was taken from Nemet (2006) for 1975-2002 and from Winegarner (2011) and company annual
reports for the years 2003-2010.
cost of production. The addition of new capacity and intensifying competition among new
and established polysilicon manufacturers, as well as the development of new cost reducing
innovations in the manufacture of polysilicon, have led many industry observers to forecast
a continued decline in the price of polysilicon and consequent decline in module prices (see
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Fessler (2012) and Prior and Campbell (2012)).
We use a variation of the model described in section 4.2 to simulate the impact of the
forecasted polysilicon price drop on the price of solar modules. To focus on the impact of
polysilicon price declines, we consider a variation of the model with polysilicon as one input
and all other inputs lumped together as the second input. With the Leontief production
function described in section 4.2, this results in the unit cost of ﬁrm-j being,
cj =
v
a
+ zj (12)
where v is the price of polysilicon, a is the quantity of polysilicon needed to produce one
watt of solar modules, and zj is the non-polysilicon cost of ﬁrm-j. The price of polysilicon
in 2011 was constructed from annual reports of leading polysilicon companies. The annual
revenues of four polysilicon companies (Wacker, REC, GCL-Poly and Daqo) were divided
by the annual shipments to obtain the average selling price of each company. A quantity
weighted average of these prices was taken as the price of polysilicon, which was found to be
$59 per Kg. The data on a was obtained for a few of the solar module companies mentioned
in section 5 from their annual reports, and the average value obtained was 5.6 grams per watt.
The variable zj includes the costs of all other factors of production (labor, capital, utilities
and other raw materials) and was calculated from the data on cj , v and a, i.e zj = cj −
v
a
.
In the simulations, the values of a and zj were left at their 2011 values and the price of
polysilicon was reduced from the 2011 value of $59/Kg to $15/Kg, which is almost a 75%
reduction in the price. The simulations were done for three value of η, η = 5.5 which we
consider as a baseline case based on the estimates in section 5, a low value η = 2 and a high
value η = 10. Two values of ρ were also considered (ρ = 10, which is used in Atkeson and
Burstein (2008) and a value of ρ = 20). Note that a higher value of ρ means that products
are less diﬀerentiated, and ﬁrms have less market power. The results are shown in Table 2,
with the last column showing the quantity weighted average module price.
A 75% reduction in the price if polysilicon (from $59 per Kg to $15 per Kg) causes
22
Table 2: Impact of polysilicon price decline on average module price
η ρ Polysilicon price (v) Module Price
5.5 10
59 1.21
15 1.04
5.5 20
59 1.10
15 0.99
2 10
59 1.31
15 1.10
2 20
59 1.23
15 1.06
10 10
59 1.17
15 1.02
10 20
59 1.06
15 0.96
a reduction in module price of between 8.6% and 16%, depending on the values of η and
ρ. Note that the module price is lower with higher values of η because the markups of
the module companies decrease as demand for solar electricity becomes more elastic (i.e
solar generated electricity becomes less diﬀerentiated from electricity generated from other
sources.) Similarly, module price is lower with higher values of ρ because the modules of
diﬀerent companies become less diﬀerentiated leading to a decrease in markups. In all cases
listed in Table 2, the resulting module prices are still considerably higher than target values
given in many studies at which large-scale adoption of solar would occur. For example, a
recent study by the U.S Department of Energy (DOE (2012)) sets a target module price
of U.S $0.54 per watt to achieve large-scale residential adoption of solar in the U.S.11 The
results in Table 2 raises the question of size of reduction in non-polysilicon costs that will
11DOE (2012) estimates that a module price of $0.54 per watt is required to achieve a total system price of
$ 1.5 per watt, a price which DOE argues will make solar energy competitive with other generation sources
in the U.S. This target, and other similar ones, are based on many assumptions but provide a benchmark to
compare the results of the simulation.
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result in equilibrium module prices near the targets given in DOE (2012). To explore this,
we simulate the model with a reduction in non-polysilicon cost, alongside the reduction in
polysilicon price to $15 per Kg. We assume that the non-polysilicon cost of all ﬁrms decline
by the same factor, and consider 3 scenarios in which the non-polysilicon cost declines by
25%, 50% and 75%. Table 3 shows the results of the simulation.
Table 3: Impact of decline in polysilicon and other costs on average module price
η ρ Reduction in non-polysilicon Cost Module Price
5.5 10
25% 0.80
50% 0.56
75% 0.30
5.5 20
25% 0.76
50% 0.53
75% 0.28
2 10
25% 0.85
50% 0.59
75% 0.33
2 20
25% 0.81
50% 0.54
75% 0.31
10 10
25% 0.79
50% 0.55
75% 0.29
10 20
25% 0.74
50% 0.51
75% 0.26
If we take the module price set by DOE (2012) of $0.54 per watt as a target, we see
from Table 3 that a 75% reduction in non-polysilicon cost achieves the target under all
values of η and ρ considered, while a 25% reduction in non-polysilicon cost will not suﬃce
under any of the values of η and ρ considered. A 50% reduction in non-polysilicon cost
will achieve the target under the assumption of the high value for ρ. The simulations above
provide a ﬁrst attempt at using a rigorous model to examine the impacts on equilibrium
price. A useful extension of the model would be to break up the non-polysilicon cost, zj ,
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into various components like labor, capital and others and examine the eﬀects of reduction
in these component costs on equilibrium module price.
7. Conclusion
We developed a model of competition in the solar module industry that is consistent with
three observed facts. Firms charge diﬀerent prices, they diﬀer in their price-cost markups
and larger ﬁrms tend to have higher markups. The model was calibrated using data collected
from a number of sources and the calibrated model was used to evaluate the impact of a
decline in polysilicon price on the equilibrium price of modules. A 75% decrease in the price
of polysilicon leads to a 8.6% to 16% reduction in the average price of modules. The decline
in polysilicon price by itself does not lead to module prices that are are considered necessary
in many studies to lead to large scale adoption of solar. The polysilicon price reductions have
to be coupled with substantial reduction of over 50% in non-polysilicon costs to achieve such
targets. Simple extensions of the basic model can incorporate other aspects of the industry,
like balance of system costs. Such extended models can be used to evaluate the impact of
changes in the industry on the equilibrium price of electricity generated from solar panels,
in addition to the price of modules.
Acknowledgements
We thank Pradeep Haldar and Samuel Kortum for their suggestions.
References
Aboudi, M., 2012. Solar PV Balance of System (BOS): Technologies and Markets. Technical
Report. Greentech Media.
Atkeson, A., Burstein, A., 2008. Pricing-to-market, trade costs, and international relative
prices. American Economic Review 98, 1998–2031.
25
Baker, E.D., Solak, S., 2011. Climate change and optimal energy technology R&D policy.
European Journal of Operations Research 213.
Bruton, T.M., 2002. General trends about photovoltaics based on crystalline silicon. Solar
Energy Materials and Solar Cells 72, 3–10.
Dixit, A.K., Stiglitz, J.E., 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity.
American Economic Review 67, 297–308.
DOE, 2012. Sunshot Vision Study. Technical Report. Department of Energy.
Feldman, D., Barbose, G., Margolis, R., Wiser, R., Darghouth, N., Goodrich, A., 2012.
Photovoltaic (PV) Pricing Trends: Historical, Recent, and Near-Term Projections. Tech-
nical Report. National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory.
Fessler, D., 2012. Polysilicon prices in 2012: The tipping point for solar. Investment U .
IEA, 2010. Trends in Photovoltaic Applications. Technical Report. International Energy
Agency.
Lewis, N.S., Nocera, D.G., 2006. Powering the planet: Chemical challenges in solar energy
utilization., in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, p. 15729 15735.
Maycock, P., 2002. The world photovoltaic market. PV Energy Systems .
Nakicenovic, N., Riahi, K., 2002. An assessment of technological change across selected
energy scenarios. Technical Report RR-02-005.
Nemet, G.F., 2006. Beyond the learning curve: factors inﬂuencing cost reductions in photo-
voltaics. Energy Policy 34, 3218–3232.
26
Prior, B., Campbell, C., 2012. Polysilicon 2012-2016: Supply, Demand and Implications for
the Global PV Industry. Technical Report. Greentech Media.
Schaeﬀer, G.J., 2004. Photovoltaic power development: Assessment of strategies using ex-
perience curves (acronym PHOTEX). Technical Report Synthesis Report.
Seel, J., Barbose, G., Wiser, R., 2012. Why are Residential PV Prices in Germany So
Much Lower Than in the United States? Technical Report. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory.
Smith, A., Venables, A.J., 1988. Completing the internal market in the european community
: Some industry simulations. European Economic Review 32, 1501–1525.
Swanson, R.M., 2006. A vision for crystalline silicon photovoltaics. Progress in Photovoltaics:
Research and Applications 14, 443–453.
Winegarner, R.M., 2011. Polysilicon (supply and demand).
http://www.sageconceptsonline.com/docs/report2.pdf.
Yu, Y., Song, Y., Bao, H., 2012. Why did the price of solar pv si feedstock ﬂuctuate so
wildly in 20042009? Energy Policy 49, 572–585.
27
